Pro-Government Militias
South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) (Sudan)
Basic Group Information
| Name assigned by coder: | no |
| PGM ID Number: | 259 |
| Country: | Sudan |
| Date formed: | Dec. 18, 1997 |
| Accuracy of date formed: | year |
| Details of Formation: | In 1997, SPLM breakaway factions united in Khartoum to form one front, which was also known as United Democratic Salvation Front. In 1997, these militias signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement and thereby became a formalized pro-government umbrella organization with the name South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) (Arnold 2007). Signatories of the Khartoum Peace Agreement were the South Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A) of Dr. Riek Machar, Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (Bahr al-Ghazal group) of Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, Kawa Makwel-led South Sudan Independent Group (SSIG), Equatorial Defence Force (EDF) of Dr. Theophilus Ochang Loti, the Union of African Parties (USAP) led by Mr. Samuel Aru Bol and the Alliance of Bor Citizens led by Arok Thon Arok. |
| Date dissolved: | Jan. 10, 2006 |
| Accuracy of date dissolved: | day |
| Details of Termination: | The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 stipulated that all armed groups had to integrate either into the SPLA or the SAF by January 2006. In January 2006, the Salvo Kiir, president of South Sudan, and Paulino Matiep of the SSDF signed the Juba declaration, by which the SSDF was to join the SPLA and Paulino Matiep became the SPLA’s deputy commander in chief. Soldiers adhering to the program then received the same salaries as SPLA soldiers (Arnold 2007). Although a large majority of SSDF declared allegiance to the SPLA, not all SSDF members joined the SSDF. Some were integrated into the PDF (Young 2006). Still others reorganized under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Gordon Kong and maintained an armed presence in South Sudan. These activities were in contradiction to the CPA, but the army continued to (now unofficially) provide the group with arms. This part of pro-government SSDF after 2006 are coded as separate PGM, SSDF informal, as government-relation changed. |
| Termination Type(s): | PGM defects |
Former and Successor Group Information
| Predecessor group(s): | none |
| Successor group(s): | South Sudan Defence Forces - informal (SSDF - informal) |
| Private Military Company? | no |
| Former Group? | yes |
| Former Armed Group? | yes |
| Former Rebel Group? | yes |
| Former Rebel Group UCDP ID: | none |
| PGM Becomes Rebel Group? | yes |
| Successor Rebel Group UCDP ID: | 466 |
Government Relation, Support, and Training
| Government Relation: | semi-official (type 2) |
| Created by the Government?: | no | Main Creating Government Institution: | none |
| Government Link(s): | state (institution); sub-national government; military (institution) |
| If link to party, name of party: | None |
| Training and Equipment: | yes |
| Shared Information and Joint Operations: | yes |
| Shared Personnel: | yes |
| Type(s) of Material Support: | domestic government; plunder and loot |
| State Sponsor(s): | none |
| Other Connection(s): |
Group Characteristics
| Membership: | ethnic; former rebels |
| Primary Membership: | ethnic |
| Alternative Primary Membership: | no information |
| Location: | Southern Sudan (e.g., Eastern Equatoria, Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei, Upper Nile) |
| Force Strength: | [6000, 50000] |
| Target(s): | civilians; rebels, insurgents, or other armed group; regular military force; foreigners; other pro-government militias |
| Purpose(s): | protect state, national or religious institutions; protect property and investment; self-defense and security; intimidation of civilians; fight insurgents |
Ethnic Characteristics
| Ethnic Target(s): | none |
| Quality of Information for Ethnic Targeting: | not applicable |
| Ethnic Membership: | Nuer (Sudan); Other Southern groups (Sudan) |
| Quality of Information for Ethnic Membership: | given |
| Ethnic Purpose: | none |
| Quality of Information for Ethnic Purpose: | not applicable |
Other Information
| Other Information: | SSDF is an umbrella organisation that unites Southern militias in their struggle against the SPLM/A. Members (25 in total): SSIM/A, SSUM/A, SSIG, SPLA Bahr el Ghazal, Bor Group, EDF, USAP, Murle Forces, Mundari Commandos, SSDF Tanginya, Thourjikany Forces, SSLM/A, etc (remaining are unknown). Some of these groups still act independently (SSIM/A, SSUM/A, SPLA Bahr el Ghazal, EDF, Murle Forces, Mundari Commandos, SSDF Tanginya, Thourjikany Forces, SSLM/A) and are coded separately. The political wing of the SSDF is the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). Many SSDF militias are based in oil-rich Upper Nile. In contrast to the SPLA, which fought the government but advocated for a unified Sudan, the Khartoum-allied SSDF fought for Southern independence. The SSDF leadership was mostly Nuer, although there were also significant numbers of Dinka members (Arnold 2007). The Khartoum Agreement gave SSDF members a sense of identity, a rationale for their tactical alliance with the government, and a measure of assurance that others would come to their defence if they were attacked (Young 2006). |
New Variables from Meta-Analysis
Purpose
| Purpose: | The SSDF fulfilled several purposes for the Sudanese government: The SSDF contributed to generate general instability in the South and thereby function as political argument against the SPLA. The instability also functioned as an argument to delay the withdrawal of Sudanese troops from the South (Arnold 2007). The government profited from the two ideologically rebel factions – SSDF and SPLA – fighting within the government’s policy of promoting internal divide. Moreover, the government profited from the SSDF’s control of southern territory to gain access to oil fields (UCDP). The SSDF was considered to be the most effective tool in the government’s fight against the SPLA. They were much cheaper than using official government forces. As SSDF members died in action, the death of government forces could be averted and political costs for the government were reduced (Young 2006). |
| Relative Benefit(s) of PGM Use | cheaper mobilization |
Treatment of Civilians
| Treatment of Civilians: | A news source reports that the SSDF originally were thought to defend the civilian population against the SPLA rebels. However, the SSDF themselves soon became agents of destruction and looted villages. In 2004, at least one civilian was killed. |
| Type(s) of Violence against Civilians: | killing |
Reasons for Membership
| PGM Members Coerced? | no information |
| PGM Members Paid? | yes |
| Reasons for Membership: | Recruitment occurred locally and was personality and ethnicity driven. Many SSDF members were convinced that their force would be necessary until independence of South Sudan was assured. SSDF commanders received direct cash payments from the Sudanese Armed Forces. Senior commanders also received houses and cars in Khartoum. Some SSDF commanders, such as the Murle commander Ismail Konyi, passed parts of their payments down to their soldiers, but this was not the case for all SSDF members (Arnold 2007). The payment, together with fears of Dinka domination through the SPLA and the dislike of the rule of rule of John Garang, were motivations for SSDF members (Young 2006). |
| PGM Members Killed? | sometimes |
PGM Size
| Size: | According to a news source from 2004, the SSDF was comprised of about 25 militias that had several thousand members who could mobilise thousands more. At its peak, the SSDF comprised a significant number of members. Estimating membership is problematic, as recruitment of some groups was ongoing and the SSDF member groups were non-regular forces, making the dividing line between civilians and combatants very grey. Some fighters identified themselves as affiliated with the group at one point, but did not adhere to the SSDF anymore after a certain objective was achieved. Although a large majority of SSDF joined the SPLA after the Juba Declaration, the informal SSDF loyal to the army still numbered around 6,000 (Young 2006). The actual number of SSDF membership prior to 2006 was thus probably much higher. |
Weapons and Training
| Weapons and Training: | The SSDF mainly used small arms and a limited number of mortars and heavy machine guns. They acquired weapons from past battles and bought ammunition from soldiers and officers in the SPLA who were sympathetic to them or corrupt. Some individual soldiers sold cattle to buy arms. The Sudanese Armed Forces supplied the SSDF with arms and ammunition (Arnold 2007). |
Organisation
| Organisation: | Cooperation between the Sudanese government and the SSDF was formalized in the Khartoum peace agreement. It allowed rebel factions to keep their militias in exchange for helping the government fight the rebel SPLA. The SSDF had little internal coherence; this lack of coherence was actively supported by the Sudanese Armed Forces who bypassed the SSDF command structure to interact directly with individual commanders. Individual soldiers were under the direct control of their respective commanders and did not respond to an overarching chain of command. SSDF units had little day-to-day contact between each other, except for senior officers in larger cities. Many SSDF commanders held formal positions in the SAF (Arnold 2007). They were rapidly promoted in order to gain allegiance. In contrast, rank and file soldiers were only supplied by the army with weapons and left for looting in order to promote antagonistic relations in the local community (Young 2006). The SAF was the near exclusive supplier of material support to the SSDF. The SSDF’s leaders were Riek Machar (until he defected in January 2000), Jathum Jathum, Gatlauk Deng, and especially near 2005, Paulino Matiep (Arnold 2007). |
Reference(s) for Meta-Analysis
Evidence
- Examine the evidence for this coding.